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1 Introduction
The U.S. tax system relies on a form of voluntary compliance. Under U.S. law, taxpayers are
required to assist tax authorities by reporting their incomes honestly and paying taxes based on
their reported incomes. The system is actively enforced by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and
the courts, who can impose substantial penalties for noncompliance. Nevertheless, tax evasion is a
major concern in the United States, and even more so in other countries.2 Individuals underreport
approximately 10.6% of their incomes annually in the United States, and the IRS estimates that tax
evasion reduces U.S. tax collections by $190 billion annually (Herman, 1998). Little is understood
about the factors that determine how much income individuals report to the government and,
of particular interest to policymakers, about the way in which aggregate compliance responds to
changes in the economic and policy environment.
This paper analyzes a feature of tax enforcement that encourages a particular dynamic tax
evasion pattern in the United States. The IRS is careful not to disclose its audit policies, but there
is some consensus within the taxpaying public about various aspects of its practices. Tax returns
are selected for examination in an initial pass, and if not chosen within a period of about a year, a
return is very unlikely to be examined later unless some unusual event draws the IRS's attention
to it. U.S. law provides statutes of limitations | three years for minor tax evasions and six years
for major tax evasions. The determinants of whether a return will be audited are not known with
certainty, but the audit probability is widely believed to be a function of the extent to which a
taxpayer underreports income in the current year. Under these circumstances, a taxpayer who
evades much of his tax liability in one year has an incentive to report honestly in the following
year, since, if he is subsequently audited and caught evading, he is at greater risk of incurring
substantial penalties for past evasions.
Section 2 of the paper formalizes this notion by introducing a model of tax evasion in which
taxpayers who were not audited during the previous year are conscious of their potential liabilities
for undiscovered past evasions. As a general matter, these taxpayers are likely to evade less this
year if last year's evasion level was particularly high, and conversely, to evade more than usual
following a year of little evasion. These general tendencies are tempered somewhat by the dynamic
nature of any taxpayer's compliance problem. Higher-than-normal evasion in a year following little
2The paper uses the term \evasion" to include not only fraudulent evasion but also other forms of willful income
underreporting for tax purposes that may dier legally from evasion. See also footnote 10.
1evasion makes sense, but imposes some costs on a taxpayer in the subsequent year, when evasion
becomes more costly since more is at risk. The cumulative incentives facing individual taxpayers
become somewhat complicated functions of past evasion behavior and expected future variables.
It is possible for the dynamic behavior of aggregate evasion to dier substantially from the
behavior of any individual taxpayer. Individuals may alternate years of high evasion followed by
low evasion. If, however, two individuals evade taxes in cycles perfectly out of phase with each
other, with one evading a large amount while the other evades little, then their aggregate behavior
may not be cyclical at all.
Aggregate tax evasion behavior will, however, show predictable cyclical patterns in the presence
of observable aggregate economic shocks that inﬂuence most taxpayers. For example, tax evasion
rates are likely to fall during recession years, since most taxpayers nd that their stocks of past
(and yet undiscovered) evasions loom large relative to their (reduced) current incomes. Tax rate
changes and changes in enforcement eorts generate analogous aggregate responses. Section 3
presents calculations of the aggregate responses of taxpayers to changes in the general economic
environment.
Section 4 of the paper examines aggregate tax enforcement and compliance behavior in the
United States over the 1947-1993 period. The evidence is consistent with the important aspects
of the model of tax evasion dynamics analyzed in sections 2-3. One feature of the model is that
audits include retrospective examination of the tax returns of individuals caught evading. While it
is not possible to check this specication directly, annual nes and penalties imposed by the IRS
subsequent to audits are positively correlated with contemporaneous and several lags of tax evasion
as calculated from national income account statistics.
The model implies that positive changes in tax rates and income growth stimulate greater
evasion (as a fraction of income), while higher tax enforcement intensity discourages evasion. The
regressions indicate that the level of aggregate tax evasion, and changes in the level of evasion,
respond to aggregate variables in a manner that is consistent with these predictions. Specically,
tax evasion appears to rise and then fall in response to positive shocks to income. Similarly, lagged
tax evasion is negatively correlated with current tax evasion after controlling for other changes in
the economic environment.
Section 5 considers some of the implications of tax evasion behavior that is inﬂuenced by tax
evasion in previous years. The estimates reported in section 4 imply that aggregate tax evasion in
2the United States is 42% lower than it would be if taxpayers were not conscious of their uncaught
past evasions when reporting their current incomes to the government. Another implication of the
estimated parameters is that doubling the current penalty rate from 25 to 50% would reduce the
average evasion rate by only 8%. The model implies as well that any tax revenue gains associ-
ated with tax amnesties are likely to be short-lived, as taxpayers participating in amnesties have
incentives to raise their subsequent evasion rates since they have less to hide from the government.
Section 6 is the conclusion.
2 A Model of Tax Evasion Dynamics
This section presents a tax evasion model in which undiscovered past tax evasion inﬂuences current
behavior. In the interest of expositional clarity, the model simplies certain aspects of the legal
and economic environment.
2.1 The Basic Framework
The model considers cases in which individuals choose the fraction of income they report to the IRS
while facing stochastic probabilities of being audited. If individuals are caught evading taxes this
year the IRS examines their tax returns for the previous year as well.3 In this simple specication
of the model, unreported income is either discovered by an IRS audit in the year that follows the
tax ling, or is discovered when the taxpayer is audited and caught evading the following year, or
else is never discovered.4
Taxpayers are risk-neutral, and therefore select evasion strategies that minimize the expected
3The assumption that retrospective audits are limited to only one previous year simplies the derivations but can
easily be relaxed. Under U.S. law, there is a three-year statute of limitations for government prosecutions of \small"
evasions (underreportings of 25% or less of Adjusted Gross Income), a six-year statute of limitations for \large"
evasions, and no statute of limitations for prosecutions of tax fraud. This issue is discussed at length in section 4.
4This specication of IRS behavior is consistent with the description of Sprouse (1988) and others of how the
IRS behaves in practice. Such behavior may represent rational policy on the part of an IRS that faces population
heterogeneity in which certain individuals are simply honest and never evade, while others are less honest and are
therefore willing to evade. A taxpayer who is caught with undeclared income in one year is more likely than the
population average to have undeclared income in the previous year. Aczel (1994) warns taxpayers to \make no
mistake, the [IRS] agent's supervisor strongly encourages the agent to audit other tax years as well as the one
currently being examined [...] Auditing more years for a person suspected initially of hiding income or over-claiming
deductions can be a protable undertaking for the government. [...] long audits, covering four or more tax years, are
not uncommon. The Service strongly encourages this practice."
3discounted sum of tax payments and penalties.5 Using yt to denote true income in year t,a n
individual chooses to report dt of income to the government, leaving an amount (yt−dt) unreported.
The evasion rate is the fraction of income not declared to the tax authorities; it is denoted et 
(yt − dt)=yt. For simplicity, taxes are taken to be linear functions of income at rate t in period t.
Then an individual's self-reported tax liability is: tdt = tyt(1−et), which excludes the obligation
a taxpayer faces if caught cheating by the government.
The probability that an individual is audited is an increasing function of the current evasion
rate.6 In addition, the audit probability is a function of the enforcement eorts of the IRS. The
function (pt;e t) indicates the probability that an individual's tax return will be selected for audit,
in which pt denotes the intensity of enforcement eorts and et the individual's evasion rate. In the
notation that follows, this function is often represented in the simplied form t(et), the subscript
t to the  function denoting that variables outside of an individual's control are held constant.7
Individuals who are audited and caught evading their taxes incur several costs. The rst is the
burden of repaying with interest past taxes due plus penalties charged by the IRS on unreported
income discovered by audits.8 Other costs include the pecuniary and psychological costs of enduring
audits and court trials, as well as prison time or other sanctions imposed on individuals found guilty
of major crimes. Of these, the model incorporates only the rst. Criminal penalties such as prison
5This formulation is chosen in order to focus the model on the dynamic issues raised by the ability of the government
to discover past undeclared income. The implications of the model used here generalize naturally to cases in which
individuals exhibit risk aversion of a type considered in other studies.
6As in Reinganum and Wilde (1985), Border and Sobel (1987), Scotchmer (1987), Yitzhaki (1987), S anchez and
Sobel (1993), and Cremer and Gahvari (1994). Andreoni et al. (1998) survey this literature. There is lively speculation
about the algorithm used by the government to select tax returns for audit, much of the speculation fueled by the
unwillingness of the IRS to reveal anything about its screening methods. See, for example, Burnham (1989). The
model assumes that the IRS does not use past information (including an individual's audit history) in selecting
returns to audit this year | a specication that is consistent with information from various sources indicating that,
until very recently, the IRS technology made it impossible for them to use the results of past audits as criteria in
selecting returns for new audits. (This limitation did not prevent the IRS from examining earlier returns of taxpayers
in the course of audits in subsequent years.) The model and empirical work that follows assume that tax evasion
takes the form of underreporting income rather than overclaiming tax credits, claiming too many exemptions, or
using other tactics. The model also ignores the fact that sources of income dier in the ease with which taxpayers can
successfully underreport income to the IRS without being caught | though incorporating such income heterogeneity
would change the model very little.
7Here and elsewhere, annual income yt is taken to be unaected by levels of tax enforcement and individual evasion
decisions. Of course, in a general model in which individuals simultaneously work, save, and evade taxes, changes
in the intensity of tax enforcement, and changes in the penalties for tax evasion, may inﬂuence individual decisions
of how much income to earn. These issues are examined by Weiss (1976), Pencavel (1979), Sandmo (1981), Cowell
(1985), and Mayshar (1991), but are not incorporated in the model that follows.
8The subsequent analysis assumes that IRS audits are successful at identifying all of a taxpayer's evaded income.
In practice, audits are not always so successful. Models incorporating the inability of the IRS to detect all unreported
income have features that are almost identical to those analyzed here.
4terms are very seldom imposed on tax evaders other than those who are signicant criminal gures.9
If caught evading taxes, an individual must pay with corresponding interest the amount owed
plus a penalty that is generally equal to 25 percent of the previously unpaid tax liability. This
penalty rate,10 which has stayed roughly constant over time, inﬂuences an individual's incentives
to report income to the IRS; we use a time-invariant parameter, , to denote the penalty rate.
In selecting the amount of income to report in one year, an individual who seeks to minimize the
present discounted value of lifetime tax liabilities must incorporate the impact of this year's evasion
on all future tax liabilities. Consider the case of an individual with t−1et−1yt−1 of undiscovered
tax liabilities for year t − 1. We denote by Vt(et−1) the individual's expected discounted present
value, as of period t, of all future tax liabilities as a function of aggregate variables such as income,
enforcement intensities (summarized in the t subscript), and the stock of potential liability for year
(t − 1)'s evaded taxes carried forward to period t. By Bellman's principle, Vt satises:11
Vt(et−1)=m i n e
n




in which rt−1 denotes the interest paid on unreported period (t − 1) income caught by the IRS in
period t, and the parameter  is the individual's one-period subjective discount factor. The right
hand side terms of (1) have the following interpretation: The rst term denotes tax payments in
period t before any audits take place, as a function of the level of evasion chosen by the taxpayer
for that period. The second term is expected tax payments as of period (t + 1), appropriately
discounted, conditional on not having been audited in period t. The expectations operator applies
to variables unknown at time t, such as future income and tax rates. The third term describes
what happens when the taxpayer is audited in period t: penalties and interest on all evasion in
years t and (t − 1) must be paid, and future tax liabilities now are evaluated taking into account
that there will be no evasion carried into the next period.
9The 1975 Annual Report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue reports that, over the 1971-1975 period, a
yearly average of 1,042 individuals were convicted of criminal tax fraud. This gure represents 0:0013% of the roughly
80 million individuals who led tax returns each year over that period.
10Strictly speaking, there are more than 100 dierent penalties that can be applied to tax returns that are negligent,
fraudulent, frivolous, contain substantial valuation errors, understatements of tax liabilities, or other defects. Penalty
rates depend on the nature and severity of the infraction. The 25 percent gure characterizes the common practice
in serious cases.
11Shortly we provide sucient conditions for this problem to be well dened.
5Equation (1) illustrates the importance of the dynamic considerations in the taxpayer's choice
of evasion level. If taxpayers who are caught evading in one year are never investigated for their
behavior in the previous year, then Vt+1 is a constant and the rst order condition becomes:
1
1+
= t + et0
t(et): (2)
Equation (2) has certain well-known properties, including the feature that the tax rate and
the level of income have no impact on the evasion rate, as long as the  function takes the form
assumed in its specication as t(et). The reason is that the return to evading and the penalty
for being caught evading are both homogeneous of degree one in income and the tax rate, so the
marginal condition that characterizes optimal evasion behavior as a fraction of total income is
unaected by income and tax rate changes. A number of earlier tax evasion studies examine the
impact of risk aversion in the consumer's utility function, in part because risk aversion can introduce
correlations between the fraction of income evaded and tax rates and income.12 Of course, even
in the formulation of the static model with concave utility, last period's evasion level does not
inﬂuence this year's evasion decision.
2.2 Retrospective Enforcement
The following analysis considers the implications of the dynamic problem specied in (1), at times
contrasting them with the more standard implications of (2). The purpose is to identify properties
of the value function and the implied evasion behavior of rational taxpayers. The results establish
conditions under which a unique, increasing, concave, and dierentiable value function exists. Fur-
thermore, under these conditions, the implied evasion correspondence is single-valued, decreasing,
continuous, and decreasing in past evasion. These properties reinforce economic intuition concern-
ing the eects of retrospective auditing, and provide the foundation for the simulations and data
analysis that follow.
In order to prove formal results, and to compute expressions for value functions and optimal
policies, it is necessary to make assumptions on taxpayers' expectations about the future values of
12As in, for example, Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Srinivasan (1973), Yitzhaki (1974), Christiansen (1980), Jung
et al. (1994), and Bernasconi (1998). In addition, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Rickard et al. (1982) consider
the eect of retrospective auditing in settings in which the probability of an audit is unaected by the rate at which
a taxpayer evades. These studies nd that the threat of retrospective audits reduces tax evasion by increasing the
associated potential penalty.
6interest rates, income growth, tax rates and enforcement behavior by the IRS. We assume that the
preceding variables remain constant (and that taxpayers are aware of this). Toward the end of this
section we consider the case where these parameters may change.
Denoting Wt(et−1)  Vt(et−1)=tyt, our assumptions on the evolution of future variables imply
that Wt does not depend on t. It follows from dividing both sides of (1) by tyt that
W(et−1)=m i n e
n
(1 − e)+(1 + g)(1 − (e))W(e) (3)
+ (e)[(1+)(e + xet−1)+(1 + g)W(0)]
o
;
in which x  (1+r)=(1+g), with g denoting the growth rate of y, i.e., g  [(tyt−t−1yt−1)=t−1yt−1].
The time subscript is omitted from (e) in (3), since the audit function is unchanging. The variable
x captures the extent to which income growth and tax changes aect the relative importance of
evasion rates in adjacent periods.
The following proposition shows that the problem characterized by (3) has a well dened solu-
tion.
Proposition 2.1 Assume (1 + g) < 1. Then there exists a unique function W solving (3).
Furthermore, this function is continuous.
Proof The proof is a direct application of Blackwell's Theorem. See Appendix C.
Associated with the solution of (3) there is a policy correspondence that associates with every
past evasion rate et−1 a set of evasion rates at which the minimum of the right hand side of (3) is
attained. This correspondence is denoted by (et−1). It is non-empty since a continuous function
attains a minimum over a compact set.
It follows from (3) that W does not directly depend on . Hence the evasion correspondence
 (and the eventual policy function) do not depend on the tax rate either. The value function W
and the evasion correspondence  depend, instead, on the growth rate of tax liabilities, g,a n dt h e
factor x that captures the importance of past evasion relative to current income. Small values of x
indicate that past evasion is relatively small compared with current income, so that the individual
is likely to choose a higher current evasion rate. The value and evasion functions also depend on
the discount rate , the penalty rate , and the audit function .
The cost of carrying a larger evasion rate from the past is that, if caught evading this period,
7a taxpayer is subject to penalties that are proportional to amounts evaded. Since the taxpayer
selects the level of current evasion bearing in mind the potential penalties if caught, it follows that
W is concave rather than linear in et−1.
Proposition 2.2 The value function is increasing and concave. Furthermore, it is strictly increas-
ing at all points et−1 where (e) > 0 for all e 2 (et−1).
Proof The following notation will be useful throughout many of the proofs that follow:
A(e)  1 − e + e (1 − (e))W(e)+(e)[(1 + )e + e W(0)]; (4)
B(e)  (1 + )x(e); (5)
in which e   (1 + g). The function B(e) reﬂects the expected tax liability (including penalties)
for each dollar of past evasion at risk of being uncovered by audits this year, while A(e) reﬂects the
expected present value of all other current and future tax liabilities. Bellman's equation (3) may
then be written as:
W(s)= m i n
0e1
fA(e)+B(e)sg: (6)
Since G(e;s)  A(e)+B(e)s is linear in s, it follows that, for , e1;t−1 and e2;t−1 in [0;1]:
G(e;e1;t−1 +( 1− )e2;t−1)=G(e;e1;t−1)+( 1− )G(e;e2;t−1): (7)
Note that for any pair of real valued functions f1 and f2 dened on a compact subset of the real
line
min
e [f1(e)+f2(e)]  [min
e f1(e)] + [min
e f2(e)]: (8)
It follows that taking the minimum on both sides of (7) demonstrates that W is (weakly) concave.
Next it is shown that W is increasing. The following inequality is useful to prove this (and
other) results. Given y in [0;1] then for all z in [0;1] and all y in (y):
W(y)  W(z)+B(y)(y − z): (9)
This inequality follows from the denition of W given in (6):
W(y)=A(y)+B(y)y
8= A(y)+B(y)z + B(y)(y − z)
 min
e fA(e)+B(e)zg + B(y)(y − z)
= W(z)+B(y)(y − z):
To show that W is increasing, let y>zand y 2 (y). Then, from (9) it follows that
W(y)  W(z)+B(y)(y − z):
Since B(y)  0, with strict inequality if (y) > 0, this implies the monotonicity result for W.
The following proposition shows that the optimal evasion rate decreases with past evasion.
Proposition 2.3 The correspondence  is (weakly) decreasing. That is, if 1 2 (s1) and 2 2
(s2),w i t hs1 <s 2,t h e n2  1.
Proof Applying (9) with s1 in the place of y and s2 in the place of z,
W(s1)  W(s2)+B(1)(s1 − s2):
And applying (9) with s2 in the place of y and s1 in the place of z,
W(s2)  W(s1)+B(2)(s2 − s1):
From these two weak inequalities it follows that
W(s1)+B(2)(s2 − s1)  W(s2)  W(s1)+B(1)(s2 − s1):
As s2 >s 1, it follows that
B(2)  B(1):
And since B is increasing | which follows from assuming that  is increasing | it must be the
case that 2  1.
The model carries a number of natural implications. Taxpayers with signicant undiscovered
past evasions do well to report their incomes scrupulously for a year, in order to reduce their chances
of being caught and penalized for the past evasion. Conversely, taxpayers evading very little in the
9past have incentives to increase their evasion rates. The steady state of this process is the evasion
rate chosen by a taxpayer after a large number of years without being subject to an audit. It is
convenient to refer to this as the \conditional steady state evasion rate," or \conditional long-run
evasion rate" and denote it by e.13
Since the policy correspondence is weakly decreasing, whenever it takes more than one value
at a point the correspondence is discontinuous, and the conditional steady-state need not exist.
The following proposition provides sucient conditions for the policy correspondence to be single-
valued. It is followed by a proposition showing that, under these conditions, the policy function is
continuous. The existence of the conditional steady-state then follows directly.14
Proposition 2.4 Assume  is strictly increasing, convex, twice dierentiable, with bounded second
derivative. Furthermore, suppose the following inequality holds:15;16




Then  is single-valued.
Proof The proof is rather long and cumbersome, and therefore relegated to Appendix E.
In what follows, the policy function associated with  is denoted by . As mentioned earlier, 
does not depend on the tax rate but does vary with g, x, ,  and . It follows from Proposition 2.2
that  is (weakly) decreasing and, from the following proposition, that it is continuous.
Proposition 2.5 Under the assumptions of the preceding proposition the policy function is con-
tinuous.
Proof Since  is single valued, it suces to prove upper hemicontinuity of . And since (s)i sa
subset of the unit interval, this is equivalent to showing that  has a closed graph. Thus, consider
13It should be noted that a particular taxpayer's evasion rate is unlikely to converge to e
, since every year there is
a probability of being audited, discovered, and starting the following year with no undiscovered past evasions. This
is the reason for the \conditional" qualier.
14This amounts to saying that a continuous function from [0;1] to [0;1] has a xed point, which holds trivially.
And since the policy function is strictly decreasing, this xed point is unique.
15For (e)=pe
γ,w i t hγ  1, the following condition simplies to:




16Value function iterations show that  is single valued under weaker conditions than those that follow. Hence
Propositions 2.5 and 2.6 hold more generally than the following inequality suggests.
10a sequence sn that converges to  s, and a sequence yn 2 (sn)t h a tc o n v e r g e st o y; for the proof it
is sucient to show that  y 2 ( s).
From yn 2 (sn) it follows that for all e 2 [0;1]:
A(yn)+B(yn)sn  A(e)+B(e)sn;
with A and B dened in (4) and (5). And since A and B are continuous,17 taking the limit as n
tends to innity implies that, for all e 2 [0;1]
A( y)+B( y) s  A(e)+B(e) s:
Thus  y 2 ( s).
Some basic properties of the dynamic problem follow directly from the Bellman equation (3)
once it is shown that the value function is dierentiable. For example, the envelope theorem then
implies that:
W0(et−1)=( 1+)(et)x; (10)
in which W0 () denotes the derivative of W. Equation (10) implies that the present value of
expected tax payments beginning this period, and including nes on last period's evasion, increases
with the amount evaded last period. The increase equals the product of the additional ne the
individual must pay if audited and the probability of being audited.
The following proposition provides conditions under which (10) holds.
Proposition 2.6 Under the assumptions of Proposition 2.4 the value function has a continuous
derivative given by (10).
Proof It follows from (9) that B((s)) is a subgradient for W at s.S i n c eW is concave (Proposi-
tion 2.2), Corollary 24.2.1 in Rockafeller (1970, p. 231) implies that:




17This follows from Proposition 2.1 in the case of A and from the assumptions for  i nt h ec a s eo fB.
11And as B((u)) is continuous (B by assumption and  by Proposition 2.5), the Fundamental
Theorem of Calculus implies: W0(s)=B((s)); thereby concluding the proof.
The nal formal result in this section provides conditions for the policy function to be strictly
decreasing and the value function to be strictly concave.
Proposition 2.7 Suppose  satises the assumptions of Proposition 2.4. Then  is strictly de-
creasing and W strictly concave at points where 0 is strictly positive and  takes values larger than
zero and less than one.
Proof By contradiction. If  were not strictly decreasing, there would exist s1 and s2 with s1 6= s2,
such that (s1)=(s2)  e. Since, by assumption, both (s1)a n d(s2) are interior solutions of
the minimization problem on the right hand side of (6) and, due to the preceding proposition A is
dierentiable, it follows that:
A0(e)+B0(e)s0 =0 ;
A0(e)+B0(e)s1 =0 :
Using the assumption that B0(e) > 0, and subtracting the second equation from the rst, implies
that s0 = s1. Since this is a contradiction, it follows that  is strictly decreasing.
To show strict concavity, note that (8) holds with equality if and only if both minima on the
right hand side are attained at the same value of e that minimizes the left hand side. Thus it
suces to show that minefA(e)+B(e)e1;t−1g and minefA(e)+B(e)e2;t−1g cannot be attained at
the same value of e if e1;t−1 6= e2;t−1. Proving this is equivalent to the nal step of the proof that
 is strictly decreasing.
2.3 Simulation results
It is useful to illustrate the properties of individual evasion behavior induced by the policy cor-
respondence, both across time and during the transitions that follow changes in environmental
parameters. To perform these exercises it is necessary to specify a  (e) function in order to
solve (3) for the implied dynamic evasion behavior. In the illustrations that follow, the functional
form of  (e)i s :
(e)=pe2: (11)
12This function is convex in current evasion, which corresponds to the notion that higher evasion
levels (conditional on income) are associated with much greater chances of being audited.18
Closed-form solutions to the value and evasion response functions implied by (11) (or any other
reasonable nonconstant enforcement function) appear not to exist. It is, however, possible to use
value function iterations to determine the optimal policy for the stochastic dynamic programming
problem specied by (3) and (11).
Figure 1 illustrates optimal evasion behavior in year t as a function of et−1.19 The evasion
response function is not quite linear, exhibiting some curvature (convexity) that is noticeable as
evasion in period t rises while the evaded amount in period t−1 falls. The conditional steady state
evasion rate, e, at which a taxpayer who was not audited last year chooses the same evasion rate
this year, is the evasion function's xed point.20 The corresponding evasion level is e =4 4 :4%; a
taxpayer evading this much runs a 14.8% chance of being audited.
Figure 2 illustrates the impact of enforcement intensity on evasion behavior. The gure depicts
two response functions, one (the solid line) in which p =0 :75, and one (the dotted line) in which
p =1 :0. Not surprisingly, higher enforcement levels induce more honest income reporting for any
level of past evasion, and thus in the conditional steady state.
Figure 3 illustrates the dynamic behavior of a taxpayer after an audit. Again, the behavior is
intuitively consistent with the model. Since audits are assumed to be successful at discovering all
of a taxpayer's undeclared income, a taxpayer in the rst year after an audit has much less to lose
from being audited again than would someone with an undiscovered recent history of past evasions.
Consequently, there is an incentive for taxpayers to evade a signicant amount in years following
audits, in eect overshooting the conditional steady-state level of evasion.21 In the second year
18We have also examined the implications of the function (e)=pe
γ.V a l u e so fγ less than unity may generate eva-
sion behavior that exhibits considerable instability at the individual level (since the evasion function is discontinuous
at a point). Thus the assumption of convexity for  in many of the propositions of this section is important.
19The parameter values are  =0 :25, p =0 :75,  =0 :96, and r = g =0 :02. These are the parameter values used
in the simulations depicted in Figures 2-7 unless explicitly stated otherwise.
20The proof of existence and uniqueness of such a point was sketched in footnote 14.
21It is worth emphasizing that the model assumes that the outcomes of prior audits do not inﬂuence current chances
of being audited. Clearly, if the model is correct, then the IRS should anticipate that individuals caught evading last
year are more likely to evade this year, since they are more likely than the population average to have unobservable
characteristics that are correlated with evading taxes, and their incentives are greater (assuming that individuals do
not expect to be audited with higher than average probability in years following audits). Landsberger and Meilijson
(1982) and Greenberg (1984) analyze the implications of population heterogeneity for optimal audit policies when the
government uses information from past audits to infer the likelihood of current evasion. In the model analyzed in this
paper, the audit probability is a function only of current year evasion, which ignores these considerations - as indeed
appears to have been IRS practice historically. Tax audits may also inﬂuence behavior by providing information and
exposing taxpayers to the costs of being audited, as Erard (1992) notes in his study of taxpayer behavior after audits.
13following an audit, taxpayers need to be conscious of their excessive evasion of the year before,
and therefore reduce their evasion to a level below the conditional steady state. After a short span
of dampening oscillation, this process converges to a steady state in which a taxpayer who is not
audited evades the same fraction of income in consecutive years.
Changes in incomes and tax rates introduce dierences between past evaded amounts and
contemporaneous conditional steady state levels, thereby generating rich evasion dynamics. Unan-
ticipated tax rate and income changes generate similar dynamics, since they eectively alter relative
stocks of past evasions. To study how individuals react to changes in income and tax rates, the
model described so far needs to be extended to incorporate these (and other) parameter changes.
For simplicity, and without aecting the qualitative nature of the conclusions derived from the
exercises that follow, we assume that individuals have static expectations about future parameters,
so that, in period t, individuals expect the growth rate of y between periods t and t+ 1, denoted
g  E[(t+1yt+1−tyt)=tyt], to prevail into the indenite future. They also believe that the current
(period t) audit function and interest rate will remain unchanged forever.
In the model described by (3), neither tax rates nor income levels directly aect evasion behavior.
What does aect evasion is the magnitude of past evasion (et−1) normalized by dierences between
past and current income and tax rates (x). Hence, if the tax rate changes at time t in an unexpected,
once-and-for-all manner, and income likewise grows in an unexpected, once-and-for-all manner, so
that y increases by a fraction g− dierent from g (i.e., tyt 6=( 1+g)t−1yt−1), then the static
expectations assumption implies that the optimal evasion level for period t can be obtained by





Figure 4 illustrates an unaudited taxpayer's response to an unanticipated tax rate reduction
of 25 percent in period 10. It assumes that the taxpayer is at the conditional steady state level
of evasion before the tax reduction, and that interest rates, income growth rates, and the audit
function remain constant throughout. When the tax rate is lowered, the taxpayer's cost of being
audited relative to the benets of additional evasion increases, and current-year evasion falls as a
consequence. In the year after the tax rate change, the level of evasion is inﬂuenced by the large
14drop of the year before, and consequently overshoots the steady-state evasion level on the high side.
Oscillations ensue, quickly converging to the original steady state. Since the evasion function does
not depend on the tax rate, and the expected growth rate of y is the same before and after the
tax rate is lowered, the conditional steady state does not change. Symmetric dynamics characterize
tax rate increases, and also characterize changes in the income growth rate.
Changes in enforcement intensity inﬂuence conditional steady-state evasion levels as well as
short-term dynamics. Figure 5 depicts the eect of reducing enforcement intensity from p =1 :0t o
p =0 :75 for an unaudited individual who is in the conditional steady state prior to the enforcement
change. The reduced enforcement intensity encourages additional evasion, particularly in the rst
year of the reform (period 12 in the gure), when not only is enforcement intensity reduced but
the stock of prior unaudited evasion is smaller than the new conditional steady state.22 Evasion in
the rst year following the enforcement change overshoots the new conditional steady-state level;
evasion in the second year falls below the new conditional steady state, and a process of convergence
ensues. Greater enforcement intensity generates the same dynamics with opposite signs.
3 Aggregate Implications
Aggregate tax evasion behavior may dier from the individual behavior described in section 2.3,
since individual situations dier and a certain fraction of the population is audited each year.
The fraction audited is itself a function of the government's enforcement intensity and individual
behavior that responds to changes in enforcement intensity, income, and tax rates. Aggregate
behavior is a weighted average of the behavior of individuals in dierent situations, with weights
endogenously determined.
It is interesting to note that when the underlying parameters (enforcement, income growth,
interest rate, and tax rate) do not change, the cross-section of evasion rates converges to a steady
state (invariant distribution) and aggregate evasion approaches a limit. Once an economy with a
22Note that it is possible that the reduction in enforcement intensity, as reﬂected by a reduced value of p,m a y
generate so much additional evasion behavior that the aggregate number of audits rises. This observation reﬂects
the general feature of enforcement problems that there may be multiple equilibria. See Cowell (1990), Wolf (1993),
and Erard and Feinstein (1994) for discussions of multiple equilibria in the tax evasion problem. As long as the
government is assumed to choose p (and not, say, the aggregate amount of resources to devote to tax enforcement)
exogenously, then the problem of multiple equilibria does not arise. Of course, such choices must be credible in order
to be eective, which raises other issues.
15large number of taxpayers approaches the invariant distribution, the law of large numbers implies
that aggregate evasion does not vary over time - even though individual evasion rates vary due
to the fact that some individuals are audited while others are not. This steady state is distinct
from an individual taxpayer's conditional steady state described in section 2, since an individual's
steady state is conditional on not being audited, while the economy's steady state is conditional on
a distribution of individual audits across taxpayers with diering evasion histories.
Aggregate tax evasion behavior responds to aggregate shocks to underlying parameters in a
manner that closely resembles the responses of unaudited individuals who start in the conditional
steady state. In part, this feature of aggregate behavior reﬂects the rather small fraction of the
population that is audited each year.
Figure 6 pictures the response of aggregate evasion to a 33 percent increase in the tax rate. As
in gure 4, evasion responds by rising in the rst period after the tax change, and falling below
the steady-state level in the second period, before oscillating toward the original steady-state level.
The path pictured in gure 6 uses the invariant distribution of taxpayers at original parameter
values as the initial cross section of evasion rates. Since the invariant distributions both before and
after the tax change are identical, the evasion rate converges ultimately to the value it took prior to
the tax change. A tax rate reduction would generate a symmetric response pattern with opposite
signs.
Figure 7 traces the aggregate impact of an increase in the enforcement intensity from p =0 :75
to p =1 :0. Again, the population of taxpayers prior to the enforcement change is assumed to
be at its invariant distribution based on original parameter values, and, as with tax rate changes,
aggregate responses resemble the behavior of individual taxpayers who have not been audited. This
time, though, the new steady state level of evasion is lower than its pre-change value. Reduced
enforcement intensity generates a similar, but oppositely-signed, pattern.23
23The exercises leading to gures 6 and 7 ignore the possibility of taxpayer specic income shocks, focusing on the
eect of aggregate shocks. As long as aggregate shocks are signicant, as indeed they are, incorporating idiosyncratic
uncertainty does not change the implied eects of shocks to aggregate evasion.
164 Dynamic Patterns of U.S. Tax Evasion, 1947{1993
This section analyzes the pattern of aggregate U.S. tax evasion over the postwar period, paying
particular attention to the dynamic issues discussed in sections 2 and 3.
4.1 Data
The fact that tax evasion is illegal makes it dicult for governments to obtain reliable estimates of
its magnitude. There is no shortage of attempts to estimate the extent of tax evasion in the United
States and elsewhere, but all face the diculty that measures of evasion are inherently suspect.
Another limitation is that continuous time series information on tax evasion is available only for
country-level aggregates. In spite of these limitations, measured tax evasion rates exhibit certain
empirical regularities, in particular a positive correlation with marginal tax rates and a negative
correlation with enforcement intensities.24
One widely-used measure of evasion is based on the notion that personal income as calculated
for national income accounting purposes (and properly adjusted for conceptual dierences) should,
in the absence of tax evasion, equal adjusted gross income reported on tax returns. The national
income and product accounts calculate personal income based only in small part on income as
reported in personal tax returns, so this measure of income is presumably very little aected by
evasion propensities.25 The Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce
reports this measure of the aggregate U.S. tax gap for every year since 1947.
Tax rate information is somewhat more problematic, since the relevant tax rate is the rate
on marginal reported income. In a progressive income tax system, this rate is endogenous to the
amount of income evaded and to the composition of the evading population. The tax rates used in
the regressions are the statutory federal marginal rates that apply to taxpayers with family incomes
equal to the mean income of the top quintile of the income distribution as reported by the Bureau
24Feige (1989) and Cowell (1990, pp. 17-27) survey the available estimates of tax evasion in large samples of
countries. The determinants of tax evasion behavior appear to be roughly consistent across available time series
studies (Crane and Nourzad (1986) and Poterba (1987)) and cross-sectional studies (Clotfelter (1983), Slemrod
(1985), Witte and Woodbury (1985), Dubin and Wilde (1988), and Feinstein (1991)), and conforms to tax collection
patterns in the panel analyzed by Dubin et al. (1990). In the only available study of taxpayer behavior in consecutive
years, Erard (1992) nds that taxpayers who are audited in one year are more likely than others to be caught
evading in the subsequent year. Since audits are not randomly assigned, however, this nding may simply reﬂect that
taxpayers have persistent characteristics.
25This measure is described by Park (1993). Appendix A provides further details concerning data sources.
17of the Census. All of the regressions were re-run using the average federal tax rate, and using the
marginal federal rate that applies to a family with the country's mean income, with little change in
the results. The marginal tax rate of families in the top quintile of the income distribution captures
general movements in marginal tax rates, but is undoubtedly a noisy indicator of the marginal tax
rates of typical evaders.
The enforcement variable is the fraction of individual income tax returns audited each year, as
reported in the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. This variable exhibits a
widely-noted downward secular drift. Alternative possible enforcement indicators include real per
capita enforcement expenditures and IRS employees as a fraction of the taxpaying population.26
All of these enforcement intensity indicators are limited by their inability to reﬂect changes in
the real eectiveness of enforcement relative to individuals' opportunities to hide their incomes.
Changes in the cost of information processing have greatly increased the eectiveness of the IRS
in certain dimensions, such as the ability to match the information in 1099 forms electronically to
taxpayer returns. At the same time, individuals' increased access to information processing lowers
the cost of various tax evasion tactics. The net change in real enforcement may be best captured,
if only imperfectly, by the audit rate.
4.2 Retrospective Enforcement
The model described in sections 2{3 is premised on the notion that taxpayers believe that if they
are caught evading taxes this year they will be investigated by the IRS for prior years. While
this specication is consistent with anecdotal evidence and warnings published in popular taxpayer
guides, individual beliefs and individual experiences are likely to vary. Due to the extremely limited
nature of the available information about tax audits, this specication cannot be tested directly.
It is, however, possible to use aggregate data to identify the extent to which penalties imposed by
IRS investigators reﬂect not only current but also past evasion.
The model implies that the amount of IRS-imposed nes and penalties subsequent to audits in
the current year (denoted Γt) is a function of the penalty rate , the probability of audit, and the
26See Hunter and Nelson (1996), who estimate a tax enforcement function for the United States based on observable
inputs such as IRS labor and capital.
18volume of current and past evasion:





t is the residual and n denotes the number of earlier years whose tax returns are subject
to examination by the IRS upon nding that a taxpayer underreports income items on a current
return. The specication in (12) leaves open the relevant size of n.
Tax revenue from individual self-reports is denoted Rt and is given by:
Rt =( 1− et)tytur
t (13)
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t−iyt−i=(tyt) is the factor by which the evasion rate in period t − i is
normalized to account for accrued interest, subsequent income growth, and any tax rate changes




The point of estimating (14) is to identify the eects of lagged evasion on current audit-imposed
penalties. In doing so, it is useful to transform (14) in a way that oers linear tests of the inclusion
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Table 1 presents estimates of alternative specications of (14) that incorporate the approxima-
tion given by (16) and correspond to diering values of n. As expected, the probability of audit has
a positive and signicant eect on audit-related penalties and nes, though the estimated coecient
19lies between 0.32 and 0.39, well below the unit value predicted by (14). Multiple lags of e appear
to inﬂuence current audit-related penalties, as indicated for example in column 3 by the coecient
of 1.070 on the sum of current evasion plus two of its lags. The third lag of evasion appears to
be appropriately included as well, since its estimated coecient, 1.332, diers signicantly from
zero but not from the coecient on current and two lags of evasion. The very low values of the
Durbin-Watson statistics in these level specications suggest, however, that rst-dierencing the
sample is necessary in order to draw valid inferences.
Table 2 presents estimates of rst dierences of (14). Here, too, multiple lags of e positively
inﬂuence current nes and penalties. In the specication reported in column 3, current plus two
lags of e has an estimated coecient of 1.0967, and the estimated coecient on et−3 is 0.9426. The
results reported in column 5 suggest that the sixth lag of e does not positively inﬂuence current
nes and penalties. This result is consistent with estimates of an unrestricted distributed lag
form of (14), reported as Appendix Table B4, in which the Schwarz statistic is maximized by the
specication that includes current plus ve lags of e. The estimated coecient on the audit rate is
insignicant in all of the rst dierence specications.
The nding that current-year penalties are functions of past evasion, the best t being the sum
of current evasion and ve of its lags, oers three useful pieces of information. The rst is that this
pattern is consistent with retrospective auditing. The nding does not, in itself, constitute proof
that auditing is retrospective, since an alternative possibility is that the IRS simply takes a very
long time to determine which returns to audit and to complete the audits it selects. But evidence
from popular accounts of IRS behavior suggests that, in fact, most audits take place soon after a
return is led, and almost always within one and a half years.27
A second implication of the penalty regressions is that the national income accounts-based
measure of tax compliance is consistent with an independent indicator of compliance, which is
reassuring given the diculty of estimating tax evasion rates by any method. The third implication
is that, since the three-year U.S. statute of limitations is extended to six years in cases of \major"
27See, for example, Sprouse (1988, p. 30). In this context, it is noteworthy that the penalty data used to construct
the dependent variables in the regressions reported in Tables 1 and 2 are those for two scal years ahead of the
calendar years for which the evasion data are reported. Hence, penalties and nes assessed in scal year 1990 (1
October 1989{30 September 1990) are considered contemporaneous with underreporting of income for calendar year
1988. Five additional lags means that income underreported for calendar year 1983 aects penalties assessed in scal
year 1990. This is an implausibly long lag if attributed simply to auditing delays.
20evasions,28 \major" evaders may account for the bulk of penalties imposed by the IRS.
4.3 Reduced Form Evasion Specications
The model specied in section 2, and for which aggregate implications are depicted in section 3,
is consistent with two alternative empirical specications of the aggregate evasion process. In the
reduced form specication of the model, aggregate evasion is a function of audit intensity as well
as changes in income and tax rates. In the structural specication of the model, aggregate evasion
is a function of lagged evasion (properly corrected for income and tax changes).
Reduced form specications stem from the comparative static exercises analyzed in section 3,
taking the initial distribution of evasion rates to be the invariant distribution. If the variation
in et−1 is small relative to that in t−1yt−1, then contemporaneous evasion becomes a function of
current audit intensity and rst dierences in income and tax rates. The model implies that audit
intensity should be negatively correlated with evasion rates, while income and tax changes should
be positively correlated with evasion rates.
Table 3 presents estimates of the simple level specication of the reduced form of the model.29
The results are broadly consistent with the theory sketched in sections 2{3. In the regression
reported in the rst column, 10% income growth is associated with 2.3% greater tax evasion.
The estimates also imply that 1% higher audit rates reduce evasion by 0.6%, and that 1% higher
tax rates increase evasion by 0.8%, though the latter eect is not statistically signicant. The
regression reported in column 2 adds log income as an explanatory variable; its estimated coecient
is insignicant, and its inclusion aects the other estimated coecients very little.30 The Durbin-
Watson statistics associated with the level specications of the reduced form model suggest that
it may be appropriate to correct for autocorrelation. Columns 3{4 describe regressions that add
estimated AR(1) corrections with results that are very similar to those presented in columns 1{2.
One of the diculties that arise in interpreting the regressions reported in Table 3 is the po-
tential role of measurement error in biasing the estimated coecients. Since personal income is
probably measured with error, and tax evasion rates are constructed from dierences between in-
come reported on tax forms and personal income measured for national accounting purposes, it is
28\Major" tax evasions occur when taxpayers underreport income by more than 25% of the total.
29Appendix B provides means and standard deviations of regression variables.
30It is noteworthy that tax evasion models based on taxpayer risk aversion typically predict insignicant eects of
income changes but signicant and positive eects of income levels.
21possible that noise in the income variable generates a spurious correlation between evasion rates
and income growth. Weighing against this possibility is the usual eect of measurement error in bi-
asing downward the estimated coecients. The net impact of measurement error on the estimated
coecients depends, therefore, on the relative magnitudes of these two eects. Appendix D oers
calculations indicating that, unless measurement error in the growth rate of income is one order of
magnitude larger than common sense indicates is possible, the reduced form results are robust to
measurement error | and indeed, may well understate the true eect of income growth on evasion.
The reduced form specication of the model can be estimated in rst dierences as well as
levels. Table 4 reports estimated coecients from rst dierence specications. The results are
generally consistent with those reported in Table 3, the major dierence being the insignicance
(and positive sign) of coecients on rst dierences of enforcement intensities. Since audit rates are
no better than passable proxies for enforcement intensities, it is not surprising that rst dierences
of this variable have little measurable impact on taxpayer behavior.31 Columns 1{2 of Table 4
report rst dierence specications that omit audit rates, while columns 3{4 report rst dierence
specications that include audit rates. The estimated coecient on the second dierence of income
in column 1 implies that 10% income growth is associated with 2.5% greater tax evasion, which is
similar to the eect estimated in levels. Tax rate changes have positive but insignicant eects on
evasion, as is true in the level specications as well.
It is possible to impose additional structure on the reduced form specication of the model by
including time-varying determinants of et−1, of which obvious candidates include lagged changes
in income and tax rates.32 The oscillations pictured in gures 4 and 5 reﬂect the impact of these
determinants of subsequent evasion.
If enforcement intensity follows a random walk, then enforcement proxies (such as audit rates)
can be omitted from the right side of rst-dierence evasion specications, since changes in enforce-
ment have the same properties as the residual. Table 5 presents estimated coecients from rst
dierence reduced form specications that omit audit intensity but add lagged second dierences
of income and tax rates. As in the regressions reported in Table 4, the coecients on the second
31Another possibility is that taxpayers learn very slowly about changes in enforcement levels, as Erard (1992)
suggests.
32Lagged tax enforcement intensity has an ambiguous eect on contemporaneous tax evasion. Stronger past enforce-
ment discourages lagged evasion, thereby encouraging contemporaneous evasion. At the same time, however, greater
past enforcement reduces the fraction of past evasions that are unaudited, thereby encouraging contemporaneous
evasion.
22dierence of tax rates are positive and insignicant; the coecients on the lagged second dierence
of tax rates equal zero. But the estimated coecients on income changes have the predicted signs:
second dierences of income have positive eects on evasion while lagged second dierences have
negative eects. The estimates reported in column 2 imply that 10% income growth is associated
with 5.7% more tax evasion contemporaneously but 1.7% less tax evasion in the subsequent year.
The reduced form regressions oer evidence that is consistent with the model described in
sections 2{3. The estimates indicate that exogenous variables (such as lagged income and tax
rates) that are positively associated with past undetected evasion are also negatively correlated
with contemporaneous tax evasion. The next section considers estimating equations in which
lagged evasion enters directly.
4.4 Structural Estimation
This section presents estimates of an approximation to the rst order condition associated with
the taxpayer's optimization problem (3) when taxpayers have static expectations concerning future
economic variables.
The rst order condition associated with (6) is:33
1
1+
= (et)+0(et)et + xt−1et−1 + e xt(1 − (et))(et+1) −
e 
1+
0(et)[W(et) − W(0)]; (17)
where et denotes the taxpayer's optimal evasion rate assuming that this period's growth rate of y
will prevail into the future.34
Take the audit function to be of the form:
t(e)=pteγ; (18)
with γ>1 to ensure both a continuous policy function (see Proposition 2.5) and an interior solution
(see Appendix F). To derive the estimating equation, use Proposition 2.6 to approximate [W(et)−
W(0)] in (17) by etW0(et), and use (10) to substitute for the latter. After some straightforward
33Appendix F identies sucient conditions for this problem to have an interior solution.
34An analogous interpretation holds for et+1.
23algebra this leads to
et '
(1 + )γxtt(et)
1 − (1 + )t(et)[(1 + γ) − (1 + gt+1)xt+1f1 − (1 + γ)gt(et)]
et−1; (19)
where xt =( 1+r)=(1 + gt)a n d1+gt+1 =( t+1yt+1)=(tyt).
Since the sample mean of the audit rate t(et) is 0.026, the denominator of the term on the
right-hand side of (19) is safely approximated by unity. Substituting pteγ for t(et)i nt h en u m e r a t o r
of the term on the right side implies:
e
−(γ−1)
t ' (1 + )γxtptet−1: (20)
Consider the case in which logpt follows a random walk with drift ,s ot h a tl o gpt =l o gpt−1++"t,
in which "t is a white noise residual. Taking the derivative of the logarithms of both sides of the
above equation then implies:




in which c = −=(γ − 1) and e "t = −"t=(γ − 1).
The above derivation can be extended to the case in which the IRS audits more than one period
of past returns, leading to





t;3et−3 + :::)+e "t: (22)
Table 6 presents estimates of diering specications of this linear approximation to the structural
evasion equation. Column 1 reports results of a specication in which only current and one lag
of et are included on the right side of the estimating equation. The coecient of −0:25 on lagged
evasion is signicantly dierent from zero, and implies a value of γ equal to 4.9. Columns 2{5
report results from specications that sequentially include additional lags of et, in all of which the
coecient on lagged evasion is approximately 0.4 and therefore implies that γ equals 3.5.
The implications of the structural estimates are quite consistent with those of the reduced
form estimates. Aggregate evasion rates are higher in years in which the stock of past evasion,
appropriately normalized by income and tax rate changes, is relatively small.35 The next section
35It is noteworthy that the range of estimated coecients on lagged evasion reported in Table 6 (-0.25 to -0.41) is,
24considers the implications of these ndings.
5 Implications
The behavior of American taxpayers carries implications for the likely eects of various tax en-
forcement policies. This section considers three issues in particular: the eect of retrospective
auditing, the eect of penalties for noncompliance, and the eect of tax amnesties. The regressions
presented in section 4 estimate structural aspects of tax compliance in the United States on the
basis of taxpayer reactions to short-term shocks to income and other variables; it is then possible
to use these behavioral parameters to draw inferences about the way in which enforcement policies
inﬂuence long-run as well as short-run tax compliance behavior.
5.1 The Deterrent Eect of Retrospective Audits
The fact that tax authorities are entitled to examine a taxpayer's returns for previous years, and
impose penalties for deciencies, has an understandably chilling eect on evasion behavior, since
the cost of triggering an audit this year includes penalties for evasion in earlier years. An alternative
legal regime, and the one typically considered in the tax evasion literature, is a system in which
the government audits only the current tax return, so any past evasions remain undetected and
unpunished. It is possible to use the parameters obtained in section 4 to estimate the extent to
which removing the threat of retrospective audits would stimulate additional tax evasion.
Equation (2) describes the behavior of taxpayers who select their evasion levels without con-
cern for retrospective audits. Applying the enforcement function (18) to (2), the representative









t denotes the evasion level chosen by a taxpayer who behaves according to a static rule
that omits consideration of retrospective audits.
with an appropriate sign change, similar to the range of income coecients reported in Tables 3-5 (0.22 to 0.57) -
though it diers from the range of estimated coecients on the less well-measured tax rate variable.
25Current values of pt can be inferred from observed audit and evasion behavior by inverting the
enforcement function (18):
pt = e te e
−γ
t (24)
in which e  denotes the observed probability of audit in period t, and e et is the observed evasion
level. At current enforcement levels given by γ and pt, (23) and (24) together imply:
es
t=e et =[ ( 1+)(1+γ) e t]
−1=γ (25)
which indicates the extent to which evasion would dier from its observed level if taxpayers were
unconcerned about being caught for their past evasions.
The value of  is xed by law at 0.25, and regressions presented in section 4 imply a γ value
roughly equal to 3.5. Observed audit rates, e t, change over time, taking a mean value of 0.0263
in the sample. Evaluating e t at this mean, and taking 0.25 for  and 3.5 for γ, the term on the
right side of (25) equals 1.72. This gure, if taken literally, implies that evasion would increase
by 72% if Americans became unconcerned about retrospective audits (or equivalently that evasion
is currently 42% below its level without retrospective audits). Evaluating the right side of (25)
separately for each year generates a series with a mean value of 1.83, similarly implying that tax
evasion would be 83% higher in the absence of retrospective enforcement. By either calculation, es
t
signicantly exceeds e et.
The exercise that generates the 72% gure is one in which taxpayers lose their fear of retrospec-
tive audits while the key tax enforcement parameters | γ and pt | do not change. The parameter
γ expresses the eciency of the process by which the IRS identies which tax returns to audit,
since higher values of γ correspond to individual audit probabilities that increase more rapidly as
the fraction of income evaded increases. In the empirical work presented in section 4, γ is taken
to be constant over time | an assumption for which there are no attractive alternatives, since
changes in γ cannot be directly measured. Holding γ constant as the retrospective nature of the
enforcement regime changes is, in this context, quite reasonable, since information from past tax
returns is not used to identify which returns to audit this year.
The parameter pt enters the audit function linearly, thereby aecting the number of audits
each year. If pt (together with γ) is kept constant as the enforcement regime changes to one in
which taxpayers do not fear retrospective audits and therefore increase their evasion, the audit
26function (18) implies a higher number of audits. With a xed enforcement budget, it is possible
that the IRS would be unable to accomodate this greater demand for audits, in which case pt
would have to fall and the level of tax evasion rise still further. In this sense, the 72% gure may
represent a lower bound on the extent to which evasion might rise in reaction to a nonretrospective
enforcement regime.36
A 72% dierence in the rate of tax evasion is not at all trivial, so it is worth considering why
concern on the part of taxpayers that they will face retrospective audits can have such a major eect
on behavior. In the context of the model, tax evasion is limited by the tradeo that consumers face
between the benets of reducing taxes today by increasing their evasion and two costs associated
with greater evasion: the cost of increasing today's audit probability plus the cost of higher penalties
for today's evasion if subject to an audit in the future. Given the rather low audit probabilities that
taxpayers face, the cost associated with triggering a current audit is considerably larger than the
expectation of future penalties for current evasion. Audits are roughly one-sixth as costly if they
trigger penalties only for current evasion and not for ve earlier years of tax evasion. Predicted
evasion does not increase to six times its prior value, however, due to the convex shape of the




3:5 =1 :67 times the value it
takes if taxpayers are concerned about audits for earlier years. Given the size of the additional
potential tax liability associated with retrospective auditing, then, 72% is a reasonable estimate of
the additional evasion associated with its removal.
5.2 Penalties for Noncompliance
An American who is caught evading taxes is generally required to pay a penalty equal to 25%
of unpaid taxes in addition to repaying the taxes he owes. The modest size of this penalty rate
is widely believed to encourage tax evasion and thereby to be responsible for the current rate of
evasion in the United States. It is possible to use the estimated value of γ reported in section 4
to evaluate the eect of penalties for noncompliance on current evasion levels. The results suggest
that, while higher penalties discourage evasion, dramatically higher penalty rates would be required
36Another possibility is that the IRS would be able to reallocate resources previously used to investigate past tax
returns in order to perform additional audits and thereby maintain pt at its pre-reform value. The static behavior
characterized by (2) has the curious feature that multiple values of pt are consistent with the same e t, a multiple-
equilibrium aspect of enforcement discussed by Cowell (1990) and Wolf (1993), consideration of which is omitted
here.
27in order to have a large impact on tax evasion rates.
Consider the linearized version of the tax evasion model analyzed in section 4. Dierentiating








(γ − 1)(1 + )
(26)
in which  is the elasticity of evasion with respect to the penalty rate. Substituting  =0 :25 and
γ =3 :5 into (26) generates an implied value of  = −0:08. This estimate indicates that doubling
the penalty rate reduces tax evasion by just 8% of its current level. This small behavioral response
reﬂects two aspects of tax penalties: the low rate at which penalties are currently applied, and the
fact that tax enforcement relies rather little on penalties.
In order to illustrate the impact of tax penalties, consider a scenario in which the government
abolishes penalties for tax evasion, so the only cost of being caught in a tax audit is the obligation
associated with current and past unpaid taxes. Even in the absence of penalties, taxpayers generally
have incentives to report to the IRS large fractions of their incomes, since excessive evasion makes
an audit extremely likely and therefore defeats the purpose of evasion. The more elastic is the audit
function (corresponding to higher values of γ), the greater the extent to which taxpayers reduce
their evasion in order to avoid being audited and caught. For those situations in which governments
impose penalties for evasion, higher values of γ reduce the magnitude of , as indicated by (26).
For the United States, the estimated value of γ =3 :5 implies that penalties play a rather small
role in deterring tax evasion.
5.3 Tax Amnesties
A typical tax amnesty is one in which a government gives its residents the opportunity to declare
any previously-unreported income to tax authorities. Taxpayers participating in amnesties must
pay their back taxes, but are not subject to penalties. Tax amnesties are popular among American
states, and appear to generate small but nonzero tax revenue in the short run | though there is
a lively debate about why it is that taxpayers who once elected not to report their incomes to the
government subsequently change their minds and participate in amnesties.37 One common criticism
37On the revenue consequences of amnesties, and possible explanations for individual participation, see Mikesell
(1986), Alm and Beck (1990, 1993), Andreoni (1991, 1992), and Dubin et al. (1992).
28of amnesty initiatives is that they may depress tax collections in the long run. The argument is
based on the notion that a government granting its rst amnesty creates the perception that it may
oer additional amnesties in the future. If the prospect of a future amnesty encourages current tax
evasion, then even one-time amnesties may reduce tax revenues in the steady state.
The model described in section 2 suggests an entirely dierent, and short-run, eect of tax
amnesties on tax collections. An individual electing to participate in an amnesty eliminates his
stock of accumulated past evasion and therefore has the least to lose of anyone in the population if
audited the following year. Such individuals have strong incentives to evade in the years following
amnesties, their optimal evasion patterns mimicking the behavior of taxpayers who have just been
audited (depicted in gure 3). Aggregate tax revenue is therefore likely to fall in years after
amnesties, though tax collections in the steady state are unaected by this dynamic consideration.
6 Conclusion
The ability of tax authorities to investigate returns for earlier years makes rational taxpayers
who have something to hide reluctant to draw attention to their current tax returns by evading
excessively. Retrospective auditing therefore creates incentives that generate short-run tax evasion
cycles in response to shocks. For habitual evaders, tax rate changes and income ﬂuctuations can
initiate such cycles, since current evasion is a function of the stock of undiscovered past evasion
normalized by current tax rates and current income. It follows that short-run aggregate tax evasion
is a function of aggregate changes in tax rates and income.
Evidence for the United States is consistent both with retrospective auditing behavior by the
IRS and with rational responses by individual taxpayers to the prospect of retrospective audits.
Three empirical regularities appear in aggregate data. The rst is that annual penalties imposed
by the IRS subsequent to audit are functions of contemporaneous tax evasion plus up to ve of
its lags. The second is that the tax evasion rate is positively correlated with income growth and
tax rate changes. And the third is that current evasion is negatively related to several lags of past
evasion normalized for income and tax changes.
These empirical ndings suggest that taxpayers respond to incentives created by the IRS, and
that various aspects of current tax enforcement policies signicantly inﬂuence aggregate compliance.
The estimated parameters imply that unreported personal income in the United States would rise
29by 72% | from 10.6% of current income to 18.2% | in the absence of retrospective auditing. The
ability of the IRS to identify the most promising returns to audit is a far more powerful enforcement
tool than is a high penalty on evaded income, since doubling the penalty rate from 25% to 50%
would reduce evasion rates by only 8%, from 10.6% to 9.7%. And tax amnesties that generate
higher tax collections immediately may signicantly reduce tax collections in subsequent years,
when taxpayers have less to fear from retrospective audits.
Tax evasion is illegal but nevertheless very common. Since the work of Becker (1968), Stigler
(1970), and others, it is understood that the volume of illegal activity responds to the likelihood of
detection and the size of penalties for those who are apprehended. In the United States, much of
the penalty for tax evasion consists of back taxes due for amounts evaded in earlier years. Explicit
consideration of these retrospective penalties, and their implications for behavioral dynamics, makes
it possible to understand important aspects of aggregate U.S. tax evasion patterns.
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A Data Sources
The income variable used in the empirical work is individual adjusted gross income (AGI) as cal-
culated from the U.S. national income and product accounts and reported by the Internal Revenue
Service on a calendar year basis for 1947-1993. Reported income (Rt) is AGI as reported on individ-
ual tax returns. Conceptually, income as measured by the national income and product accounts
and reported income should be equal in the absence of tax evasion. Both variables are converted
to per capita terms by dividing by the number of individual tax lers. Data on AGI as calculated
from the national income and product accounts, AGI as reported on individual tax returns, and
numbers of tax lers are reported in Internal Revenue Service (1995a, p. 201). Nominal variables
are adjusted for inﬂation using the personal consumption deﬂator from the U.S. national income
and product accounts.
Tax rates are marginal federal income tax rates for married taxpayers (ling jointly) with
incomes equal to the mean family income of the top quintile of the U.S. income distribution as
reported by the U.S. Census (various issues). Marginal federal tax rates are reported by the Tax
Foundation (various issues).
The number of tax audits is reported annually for 1947-1992 by the Annual Report of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (various issues), and, for 1993-1994, in Internal Revenue Service
(1995b). These sources report gures on a scal year basis, and are not perfectly consistent over
time, so it is necessary to perform some adjustments in order to make them correspond properly
to calendar year data on tax evasion, income, and tax rates. Since 1976, U.S. government scal
years start on October 1 of the previous calendar year and continue to the following September 30.
(Prior to 1976, scal years started on July 1 and continued to the following June 30.) Tax audits
are attributed to the preceding calendar years, so that, for example, audits performed in scal year
1982 (October 1, 1981 to September 30, 1982) are assumed to apply to tax returns for calendar
year 1981 for purposes of calculating audit rates.
The IRS reports numbers of audits of \individuals, partnerships and duciaries" over the period
1951-1994, but IRS audit gures for 1947-1950 include audits of corporations. Data for 1947-1950
are made comparable to those for 1951-1994 by reducing the 1947-1950 audit numbers by the
31fraction of 1951 audits that represent audits of corporate tax returns (5.18%). The denition
of an \audit" changed during 1953 and part of 1954, since \audits" during 1947-1952 include
mathematical corrections and verications that are excluded from the denition of an \audit"
after 1953. The 1955 Annual Report of the IRS Commissioner estimates that 127,000 \audits"
reported for 1954 were actually mathematical corrections and verications, so reported \audits"
for 1954 are reduced by this number in calculating audit rates. The 1955 Report indicates that, in
1954, true audits represented 50.97% of what would have been audits as previously dened (audits
plus mathematical corrections and verications). Consequently, reported audits for 1947-1952 are
multiplied by 0.5097 in calculating audit rates. Since 1953 was a transition year for audit denitions,
reported audits for 1953 receive half of the 1947-1952 adjustment (they are multiplied by 0.7548)
in calculating the audit rate for that year. The denition of an \audit" again changed in 1993.
IRS (1995b) reports audits for 1992, using the new denition of an \audit;" by comparing this
1992 gure with the gure reported in the 1993 Annual Report (and calculated under the previous
denition of an \audit"), it follows that, in 1992, \audits" as dened pre-1993 were 86.30% of
\audits" as dened starting in 1993. Consequently, audit rates for 1993 and 1994 are multiplied by
86.30% to make them comparable to pre-1993 rates.
Penalties and nes imposed subsequent to audits of individual tax returns are reported annually
for 1947-1992 by the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (various issues), and,
for 1993-1994, in IRS (1995b). As with audit statistics, these gures are reported on a scal year
basis, and are not perfectly consistent over time, so it is necessary to perform some adjustments in
order to make them correspond properly to calendar year data. Penalties and nes are attributed
to the second preceding calendar year, so that, for example, penalties and nes assessed in scal
year 1985 (October 1, 1984 to September 30, 1985) are assumed to apply to tax returns for calendar
year 1983.
The IRS reports penalties and nes on a consistent basis for 1953-1992. Penalties and nes
reported for 1952 include collections as a result of mathematical verication of returns (not formal
audits); such collections are not included in gures for years starting in 1953. The 1954 Annual
Report indicates that, for 1953, penalties and nes represent 86.03% of the sum of penalties, nes,
and collections due to verication for that year. This ratio is applied to reported collections for
1952 to put the 1952 gure on a consistent basis. Data for 1951 include not only collections as a
result of mathematical verication, but also taxes and interest on delinquent returns. Data for 1952
32report taxes and interest on delinquent returns for that year, thereby aording construction of a
correction factor (83.05%) for delinquent returns and mathematical verication to apply to penalties
and nes for 1951. For 1947-1950, the IRS reports only aggregate gures of total amounts assessed
as a result of enforcement activity. For these years, the 1951 ratio of assessments on individual
returns (net of verications and collections on delinquent returns) to total amounts assessed as a
result of enforcement activity - 35.68% - is applied to total amounts assessed to obtain gures for
individual returns. The denition of penalties and nes imposed subsequent to audit again changed
(along with the denition of an \audit") in 1993. IRS (1995b) reports penalties and nes for 1992,
using the new denition; by comparing this 1992 gure with the gure for the same year reported in
the 1993 Annual Report (and calculated under the previous penalty and ne denition), it follows
that, in 1992, penalties and nes imposed subsequent to audits as dened pre-1993 were 105.24%
of penalties and nes subsequent to audits as dened starting in 1993. Consequently, penalties and
nes for 1993 and 1994 are multiplied by 105.24% to make them comparable to pre-1993 penalties.
B Sample Statistics of Regression Variables
Appendix Tables B1, B2 and B3 present sample statistics of variables used in the regressions
reported in Tables 1-6. Appendix Table B4 reports estimated coecients from an unrestricted
distributed lag variant of (14).
C Existence of Value Function
This appendix shows that the stochastic dynamic programming problem characterized by the Bell-
man equation in (3) has exactly one solution. To do this it is sucient to show that the operator
T, dened on the set of real valued, continuous functions dened on the interval [0;1], via:
(Tv)(u)= m i n
0e1
f(1 − e)+e (1 − (e))v(e)+(e)[(1 + )fe + xug + e v(0)]g;
where e   (1 + g) < 1, is (a) bounded; (b) continuous and (c) satises Blackwell's conditions.
Existence and uniqueness of a solution to (3) then follows from the Continuous Mapping Theorem
33(see, e.g., Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 in Stokey and Lucas (1989)).
(a) Assume that v is bounded from below and above by v and v, respectively. Also note that,
since  denotes a probability, it takes values in [0;1]. Straightforward calculations then show
that:
2e  min(0;v)  (Tv)(u)  1+2e  max(0;v)+( 1+)(1 + x):
(b) Continuity of Tv follows from the Maximum Principle.
(c) Assume that v1(u)  v2(u) for all u in [0; 1]. It is easy to show that this implies that
(Tv1)(u)  (Tv2)(u) for all u in [0;1] Similarly, a straightforward calculation shows that
T[v + a](u)  (Tv)(u)+e a;
so that T is a contraction with modulus e  (which is assumed to be smaller than one).
D Measurement Error
The reduced form estimation results (reported in section 4.3) are consistent with the main impli-
cations of the model presented in this paper, and are rather less consistent with the implications of
earlier models. This raises the issue of whether these results could be due to measurement error. In
this appendix we show that, unless measurement error in income is one order of magnitude larger
than what common sense indicates, the ndings reported in section 4.3 are robust to measurement
error.
Notation and Assumptions
Let Yt and Dt denote income and reported (declared) income in period t. Lower case letters
denote the corresponding logarithms. The following equation is supposed to hold:
Yt − Dt
Yt
= c0 + c1(yt − yt−1): (27)
34We assume that yt follows a random walk with drift:
yt = g + yt−1 + vt; (28)
where the vt's are i.i.d. with zero mean and standard deviation v.
Both Yt and Dt are measured with error in (27). Measured income and measured declared
income are denoted by b Yt and b Dt, respectively, and assumed to satisfy:
b Yt = Yt(1 + t); (29)
b Dt = Dt(1 + ut); (30)
with 1; 2; 3;:::i.i.d. with zero mean and variance 2
 and u1;u 2;u 3;:::i.i.d. with zero mean and
variance 2
u. Both sources of measurement error are assumed uncorrelated among themselves (and
with the innovations driving yt).38
The equation that is actually estimated is:
b Yt − b Dt
b Yt
= c0 + c1(b yt − b yt−1) + error: (31)
It follows from (27), and (29) that the relation that really holds between observed variables is:39
b Yt − b Dt
b Yt












From equations (32) and (33) it is clear that the correlation between the regressors and the error
term will bias the estimates of c1 downward. The implications of the fact that the dependent
variable is correlated with the regressors and the error term are less obvious. As shown next, they
bias the estimated value of c1 upwards. Furthermore, we show that for reasonable parameter values
38The results that follow can be generalized to incorporate correlation between contemporaneous measurement
errors. Since calculations of income and reported income rely on some common sources, this correlation is likely to be
positive. In this case, the results that follow are even stronger, i.e., even larger values for  are needed to estimate
a positive value of c1 when the true coecient is zero (see below).
39Here and throughout the proof that follows the approximation log(1 + x) ' x is used liberally, both for x = t
and x = ut. This simplies calculations but is not essential for the results.
35the former eect dominates the latter, so that a true value of c1 equal to zero is very unlikely to
yield a positive estimate.





















1+2 q2(1 − c0); (35)
where T denotes the number of observations.
Proof Let  =[ c0;c 1]0 denote a column vector with the parameter being estimated. Let b X denote
the matrix of regressors corresponding to ,a n dX what would have been this matrix in the absence
of measurement error. Then:
b X = X + M1; (36)
with M1 denoting a (T;2)-matrix, with rst column equal to zero and t-th element in the second
column equal to t − t−1.







(1 + ut − t)





l = X+ M2; (37)
where M2 denotes the (T;1)-column vector with (Dt=Yt)(t − ut)i nt h et-th position.
We therefore have that the OLS estimate of , which we denote by b ,s a t i s  e s :
b  =( b X0 b X)−1 b X0l
=( b X0 b X)−1 b X0 [X+ M2]
36= b X0 b X)−1 b X0
h
( b X − M1) + M2
i
=  − ( b X0 b X)−1 b X0M1 +(b X0 b X)−1 b X0M2:
Hence:
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Substituting the three expressions above into (38) yields (34) and (35).
Since g is much smaller than one, it follows, due to Proposition D.1, that one may ignore any
dierence between b c0 and c0. It then follows from Proposition D.1 that it is sucient for c1 > 0
that either 1 < b c0 +2 b c1 or, should the latter not hold, that:
q2 <
b c1
1 − b c0 − 2b c1
: (39)
In particular, for b c0 =0 :118, b c1 =0 :228, and v =0 :026 (`representative' values of the estimates
produced by the reduced form equations in section 4), c1 is positive as long as the standard deviation
of measurement error in growth rates of income (
p
2) is smaller than 0.026. A standard error of
0.026 means that one third of the observed growth rates dier from the true growth rates by more
than 2.6% (in absolute terms), which is highly unlikely.
From Proposition A1 it also follows that:
c1 ' (1 + 2q2)b c1 − q2(1 − b c0): (40)
With the `representative' parameter values mentioned above and a more realistic (still conservative)
37value of q equal to 1=5, the `true' value of c1 is equal to 0.20 instead of 0.22. It is safe, therefore,
to conclude that the results obtained when estimating the reduced form equations are not simply
attributable to measurement error.
E Policy Correspondence is Single-valued
It is useful to establish some denitions and lemmas before proving Proposition 2.4.





The function K evaluated at (e;e0) is the point where the lines
Le(s)=A(e)+B(e)s;
Le0(s)=A(e0)+B(e0)s
intersect, with A and B dened in (4) and (5).
Lemma E.1 The function K satises:
(i) K(e;e0)=K(e0;e) at all points (e;e0) 2 [0;1]2 with e 6= e0.
(ii) K is continuous in both arguments.
Proof
(i) Trivial.
(ii) Follows from continuity of the value function (Proposition 2.1).
Lemma E.2 Assume 0 <s 1 <s 2  1, 1 2 (s1) and 2 2 (s2) with 1 > 2.T h e n :
s1  K(1; 2)  s2: (41)
A(2) >A (1): (42)
38Proof From 1 2 (s1) it follows that for all e 2 [0;1]:
A(e)+B(e)s1  A(1)+B(1)s1:
Hence, letting e = 2:
A(2)+B(2)s1  A(1)+B(1)s1: (43)
Therefore
A(2) − A(1)  B(1) − B(2);
and since B(1) >B (2) (because , and therefore B, is strictly increasing, and 1 > 2)w e
conclude that
K(1; 2)  s1:
A similar argument, inverting the roles of 1 and 2,s h o w st h a t
K(1; 2)  s2:
Finally we note that, since both factors on the right hand side of (43) are larger than zero, it follows
that
A(2) >A (1);
thereby concluding the proof.
Lemma E.3 If (s0) contains more than one element, say eL and eU with eL <e U, then for all
e 2 (eL;e U):
K(eL;e)  K(eL;e U)=s0  K(e;eU): (44)
Proof
Since eL and eU both belong to (s0)w em u s th a v e
A(eL)+B(eL)s0 = A(eU)+B(eU)s0:
Therefore K(eL;e U)=s0, and the equality in (44) holds.
39Since eL 2 (s0)i m p l i e st h a tf o ra l le:
A(e)+B(e)s0  A(eL)+B(eL)s0;
and since B(e) >B (eL)f o re 2 (eL;e U), it follows that K(eL;e)  s0, thereby proving the rst
inequality in (44). The second inequality is proved analogously.
Lemma E.4 Assume (e) is strictly increasing, convex, twice dierentiable, with second derivative
bounded from above by M.L e te 2 [0;1) and  2 (0;1 − ).T h e n :
A(e) − A(e + )  K1 − K22; (45)
with
K1 =1 − e (1 + )xf(1) − (0)2g−(1 + )f(1) + 0(1)g:
K2 = e MW(e + ):
Proof From the denition of A it follows that:
A(e) − A(e + )= + e [W(e) − W(e + )] + e [(e + )W(e + ) − (e)W(e)] (46)
+(1 + )[e(e) − (e + )(e + )] + e W(0)[(e) − (e + )]:
  + e T1 + e T2 +( 1+)T3 + e W(0)T4;
where the last identity implicitly denes the Ti's.
Next we use the concavity of W and the convexity of  to derive lower bounds for the Ti's on
the right hand side of (46).
Lower bound for T1:
Letting z = e +  and y = e in (9) implies that for e 2 (e):
W(e)  W(e + ) − B(e):
40It follows that
T1 − B(e):
Lower bound for T2:
Letting z = e, y = e +  and e+ 2 (e + ) in (9) leads to
W(e + ) − W(e)  B(e+): (47)
Convexity of  implies that
(e + ) − (e)  0(e);
and therefore, since W>0,
(e + )W(e + ) − (e)W(e)  [(e)+0(e)]W(e + ) − (e)W(e)
= (e)[W(e + ) − w(e)] + 0(e)W(e + ):
Substituting (47) into the preceding inequality leads to:
T2  (e)B(e+) + 0(e)W(e + ):
Lower bound for T3:
A straightforward calculation shows that (e)  e(e) is convex. It follows that
(e + ) − (e)  0(e + )
which leads to
T3 − [(e + )+( e + )0(e + )]:
Lower bound for T4:
Convexity of  implies that
(e + ) − (e)  0(e + )
41and therefore
T4 − 0(e + ):
Substituting the lower bounds for T1, T2, T3 and T4 into (46) leads to
A(e) − A(e + )   − e B(e) + e [(e)B((e + )+0(e)W(e + )] (48)
−(1 + )[(e + )+( e + )0(e + )] − e W(0)0(e + ):
Next we derive a lower bound for
T5 = 0(e)W(e + ) − 0(e + )W(0):
Since 00 is bounded from above by M, applying the Mean Value Theorem we have that
0(e) − 0(e + ) − M: (49)
F r o m( 9 )w eh a v et h a t
W(e + )  W(0) + B(e+)(e + ); (50)
where e+ 2 (e + ).
Rewriting T5 as
T5 = 0(e + )[W(e + ) − W(0)] + [0(e) − 0(e + )]W(e + )
and substituting (49) and (50) into the latter expression yields
T5  0(e + )B(e+)(e + ) − MW(e + ):
From this inequality and (48) it follows that
A(e) − A(e + )   − e B(e) + e (e)B(e+) − (1 + )[(e + )+( e + )0(e + )] (51)
+e [0(e + )B(e+)(e + ) − MW(e + )]:
42Since B i si n c r e a s i n g ,w eh a v et h a tf o ra l la 2 [0;1]
B(a)  B(0) = (1 + )x(0);
−B(a) − B(1) = −(1 + )x(1):
Using these lower bounds and the assumption that  is increasing in (51) then leads to (45).
Lemma E.5 Assume (e) satises the same assumptions as in Lemma E.4 and that




Also assume that (s0) contains more than one element, say eL and eU with eL <e U.T h e n ,f o r
suciently small (and positive)  we have that
K(eL;e L + ) >K (eL;e U): (53)
Proof From Lemma E.3 it follows that (53) will hold if and only if
K(eL;e L + ) >s 0
which is equivalent to
A(eL) − A(eL + ) > [B(eL + ) − B(eL)]s0:
It follows from Lemma E.4 that a sucient condition for (53) is
K1 − K22 > [B(eL + ) − B(eL)]s0; (54)
with K1 and K2 dened in Lemma E.4.
Convexity of  (and therefore B) implies that
B(eL + ) − B(eL)  B0(eL + ):
43Thus it follows from (54) that a sucient condition for (53) is
K1 + K2>B 0(eL + )s0: (55)
Taking  suciently small (and positive), noting that s0  1, and that convexity of B implies that
B0(eL + ) <B 0(1), it follows from (55) that a sucient condition for (53) is
K1  (1 + )x0(1)
which is equivalent to the assumption (52).
Proof of Proposition 2.4
The proof is by contradiction. If  is not single-valued there exists s0 in [0;1] and eL;e U in
[0;1] with eL 6= eU, such that eL and eU belong to (s0). Lemmas E.3 and E.5 then imply that for
e 2 (eL;e U) suciently close to eL:
K(eL;e)  K(eL;e U); (56)
K(eL;e) >K (eL;e U): (57)
Since both inequalities cannot hold at the same time, we conclude that  is single-valued.
F Sufficient Conditions for Interior Solution
Proposition F.1 Assume that:40








40The rst assumption holds, in particular, when (0) = 
0(0) = 0, and (1) < 1=[(1+r)(1+)]. For (e)=pe
γ,
with γ>1, this amounts to p<1=[(1 + r)(1 + )].
The second assumption holds, in particular, when min is suciently small and 
0(1) suciently large. For (e)=
pe
γ,w i t hγ>1, this amounts to min suciently small and p>1=[(1 + γ)(1 + r)(1 + )].
44where min  mine ((e)) = ((1)). Dene G(e;et−1) as in the proof of Proposition 2.2. Then
for all et−1 the minimum value, over e,o fG(e;et−1) is attained at an interior point of the interval
[0;1].
Proof To show that the solution to mine G(e;et−1) is interior it suces to show that the following
two inequalities hold for all et−1 in [0;1]:
@G
@e
(e =0 ;e t−1) < 0; (60)
@G
@e
(e =1 ;e t−1) > 0: (61)
It follows from (17), (10) and the fact that (1 + g)x =( 1+r)t h a t :
@G
@e
(e =0 ;e t−1)=−1+( 1+)

(0) + xet−10(0) + (1 + r)(1 − (0))((0))

;
and, since et−1  1a n d((0))  (1),41 we have that (58) is sucient for (61).
Since concavity of W implies that:
W(1) − W(0)  W0(0);
it also follows from (17), (10) and the fact that (1 + g)x =( 1+r)t h a t :
@G
@e
(e =1 ;e t−1) − 1+( 1+)

(1) + (1 + xet−1)0(1) − (1 + r)min(0(1) + (1) − 1)

:
Some straightforward algebra now shows that (59) is sucient for (60).
41The latter holds because (e)i n c r e a s e sw i t he.
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50TABLE 1
IRS-Imposed Penalties and Lagged Evasion Rates.
Dependent Variable: ln(Γt=Rt)
No. lags (n) 123456
Constant 2.8203 2.5605 2.5152 2.4093 2.4371 2.4945
(0.4430) (0.2175) (0.1631) (0.1512) (0.1466) (0.1372)
ln(Audit rate) 0.3288 0.3882 0.3561 0.3326 0.3270 0.3309
(0.0793) (0.0504) (0.0442) (0.0406) (0.0421) (0.0411)
ln(Past evasion) 0.5036 1.0207 1.0700 1.0363 1.0421 1.0499
(0.2178) (0.0644) (0.0429) (0.0409) (0.0413) (0.0373)
Additional lag 0.0722 1.1317 1.3321 1.1148 0.3074 −1:2044
of evasion (0.0049) (0.2423) (0.3776) (0.4431) (0.6119) (0.7588)
Adj. R2 .833 .928 .945 .955 .955 .960
D-W 0.455 0.798 0.852 0.762 .725 .785
N o . o b s . 4 44 34 24 14 03 9
Note: The table reports coecients from OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is the log
of the ratio of penalties subsequent to audits (Γt) to tax collections(Rt). The sample consists of annual
observations for the United States between 1947-1993. The data are constructed to treat calendar year
evasion as contemporaneous with penalties assessed two scal years later. The variable \audit rate" is the
ratio of individual tax return audits to the number of individual tax returns led. \Past evasion" is the







. n =1i nt h e
regression reported in column one and n = 6 in the regression reported in column six. \Additional lag









Standard errors are in parentheses.
51TABLE 2
First Differences of IRS-Imposed Penalties and Lagged Evasion Rates.
Dependent Variable: ln(Γ t=Rt)
No. lags (n) 123456
Constant −0:0210 −0:0127 −0:0161 −0:0123 −0:0173 −0:0166
(0.0227) (0.0230) (0.0207) (0.0182) (0.0177) (0.0168)
ln(Audit rate) 0.2546 0.2719 0.1472 0.1402 0.0816 −0:0392
(0.1311) (0.1846) (0.1676) (0.1440) (0.1407) (0.1408)
ln(Past evasion) 0.1348 1.0652 1.0967 1.0750 1.0701 1.0756
(0.0962) (0.0498) (0.0358) (0.0314) (0.0305) (0.0277)
Additional lag 0.0734 0.7900 0.9426 1.1115 0.7527 −0:7679
of evasion (0.0027) (0.1554) (0.2879) (0.3238) (0.4227) (0.5121)
Adj. R2 .945 .949 .960 .970 .973 .977
D-W 1.697 1.929 2.026 2.150 1.885 1.859
N o . o b s . 4 34 24 14 03 93 8
Note: The table reports coecients from OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is the rst
dierence of the log of the ratio of penalties subsequent to audits (Γt) to tax collections(Rt). The sample
consists of annual observations for the United States between 1947-1993. The data are constructed to
treat calendar year evasion as contemporaneous with penalties assessed two scal years later. The variable
\ln(audit rate)" is the rst dierence of the log of the ratio of individual tax return audits to the number








; \ln(Past evasion)" is the rst dierence of its log. n = 1 in the regression
reported in column one and n = 6 in the regression reported in column six. \Additional lag of evasion" is









of evasion)" is its rst dierence. Standard errors are in parentheses.
52TABLE 3
Reduced Form Model, Levels Specification.
Dependent Variable: Tax Evasion Rate
OLS OLS AR(1) AR(1)
Constant 0.1181 0.1255 0.1159 0.1468
(0.0044) (0.0187) (0.0063) (0.0274)
 Income 0.2285 0.2364 0.2202 0.2331
(0.0781) (0.0811) (0.0666) (0.0656)
 Tax rate 0.0075 0.0085 0.0158 0.0171
(0.0246) (0.0250) (0.0241) (0.0239)
Audit rate −0:0598 −0:0547 −0:0503 −0:0257
x1000 (0.0154) (0.0199) (0.0209) (0.0281)
Income 0.0062 0.0262
(0.0152) (0.0217)
b  0.3854 0.4562
(0.1450) (0.1394)
ln L 138.22 138.94
Adj. R2 .280 .266 .345 .365
D-W 1.246 1.229 1.921 1.930
N o . o b s . 4 64 64 64 6
Note: The dependent variable is the evasion rate on U.S. individual tax returns over the period 1947-
1993. The rst two columns report estimated coecients from OLS regressions; columns three and four
describe regressions that include estimated AR(1) corrections (b ). \ Income" is the rst dierence of the
log of U.S. personal income as reported in the national income and product accounts. \ Tax rate" is the
rst dierence of federal marginal income tax rates applying to taxpayers with family incomes equal to the
mean income of the top quintile of the U.S. income distribution. \Audit rate" is the ratio of individual tax
return audits to the number of individual tax returns led. Standard errors are in parentheses.
53TABLE 4
Reduced Form Model, First Differences Specification.
Dependent Variable:  Tax Evasion Rate
Constant 0.0832 −0:2088 0.1035 −0:1737
x100 (0.2095) (0.2606) (0.2064) (0.2579)
 Income 0.2511 0.1551 0.2838 0.1907
(0.0582) (0.0780) (0.0609) (0.0804)
 Tax rate 0.0227 0.0208 0.0208 0.0192
(0.0222) (0.0218) (0.0219) (0.0214)
 Audit rate 0.0726 0.0676
x1000 (0.0463) (0.0435)
 Income 0.2096 0.1985
(0.1167) (0.1152)
Adj. R2 .300 .336 .324 .355
D-W 2.403 2.309 2.311 2.226
N o . o b s . 4 54 54 54 5
Note: The columns report estimated coecients from OLS regressions in which the dependent variable
is rst dierence of the evasion rate on U.S. individual tax returns over the period 1947-1993. \ Income"
is the rst dierence of the log of U.S. personal income as reported in the national income and product
accounts, and \ Income" is its second dierence. \ Tax rate" is the second dierence of federal
marginal income tax rates applying to taxpayers with family incomes equal to the mean income of the top
quintile of the U.S. income distribution. \ Audit rate" is the rst dierence of the ratio of individual tax
return audits to the number of individual tax returns led. Standard errors are in parentheses.
54TABLE 5
Reduced Form Model, First Differences with Lags.
Dependent Variable:  Tax Evasion Rate
Constant −0:0115 0.0456 0.0654 −0:0002
x100 (0.0266) (0.1950) (0.2015) (0.0270)
 Income 0.5305 0.5703 0.5728 0.5260
(0.1751) (0.1217) (0.1231) (0.1770)
 Income−1 −0:1610 −0:1730 −0:1725 −0:1583
(0.0767) (0.0661) (0.0668) (0.0776)
 Tax rate 0.0217 0.0218 0.0223 0.0222
(0.0319) (0.0316) (0.0319) (0.0323)
 Tax rate−1 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 −0:0003
(0.0212) (0.0210) (0.0212) (0.0215)
 Audit rate 0.0277 0.0003
x1000 (0.0597) (0.0006)
 Income 0.0417 0.0493
(0.1304) (0.1326)
Adj. R2 .406 .420 .408 .394
D-W 2.204 2.217 2.201 2.186
N o . o b s . 4 44 44 44 4
Note: The columns report estimated coecients from OLS regressions in which the dependent variable
is rst dierence of the evasion rate on U.S. individual tax returns over the period 1947-1993. \ Income"
is the rst dierence of the log of U.S. personal income as reported in the national income and product
accounts, and \ Income" its second dierence; \ Income−1" is the rst lag of the second dierence.
\ Tax rate" is the second dierence of federal marginal income tax rates applying to taxpayers with
family incomes equal to the mean income of the top quintile of the U.S. income distribution, and \ Tax
rate−1" is its rst lag. \ Audit rate" is the rst dierence of the ratio of individual tax return audits to
the number of individual tax returns led. Standard errors are in parentheses.
55TABLE 6
Structural Model, First Difference Specification.
Dependent Variable: ln(et)
No. lags (n) 12345
Constant −0:0006 −0:0180 −0:0078 −0:0054 −0:0056
(0.0295) (0.0310) (0.0319) (0.0330) (0.0338)
 Potential liability −0:2580 −0:3938 −0:4123 −0:3769 −0:4049
(0.0928) (0.1550) (0.1781) (0.1860) (0.1967)
Adj. R2 .133 .113 .094 .070 .075
D-W 2.383 2.607 2.686 2.750 2.760
N o . o b s . 4 54 44 34 24 1
Note: The columns report estimated coecients from OLS regressions in which the dependent variable
is rst dierence of the log of the evasion rate on U.S. individual tax returns over the period 1947-1993. \
Potential liability" is the rst dierence of the log of the (properly adjusted) sum of evasion for the preceding
n periods, equal to: ln[
Pn
i=1 et−ixa
t−i]. n = 1 in the regression reported in column one and n =5i nt h e
regression reported in column ve. Standard errors are in parentheses.
56APPENDIX TABLE B1
Means and Standard Deviations of Variables in Tables 1 and 2
Variable Mean Std. Dev. No. obs.
ln(1000Γt=Rt) 2.9387 0.6232 44
ln(1000Γt=Rt) 0.0678 0.6149 44
ln(Audit rate) 3.1614 0.5500 44
ln(Audit rate) −0:0121 0.1734 44
ln(Past evasion), n =2 −1:0452 0.5734 43
ln(Past evasion), n = 2 0.0787 0.5572 42
ln(Past evasion), n =5 −0:4594 0.6282 40
ln(Past evasion), n = 5 0.1016 0.5952 39
Note: The table reports means and standard deviations of variables used in the regressions reported in
Tables 1-2. ln(1000Γt=Rt) the log of the product of 1,000 and the ratio of penalties subsequent to audits (Γt)
to tax collections(Rt); ln(1000Γt=Rt) is its rst dierence. The sample consists of annual observations for
the United States over 1947-1993; the data are constructed to treat calendar year evasion as contemporaneous
with penalties assessed two scal years later. The variable \audit rate" is the ratio of individual tax return
audits to the number of individual tax returns led; \ln(audit rate)" is the rst dierence of its log.






; \ln(Past evasion)" is its rst dierence. Sample statistics of these variables are presented
for n =2a n dn =5 .
57APPENDIX TABLE B2
Means and Standard Deviations of Variables in Tables 3-5
Variable Mean Std. Dev. No. Obs
et 0.1058 0.0159 46
et 0.00043 0.0168 45
ln(Income) −1:4264 0.1848 46
ln(Income) 0.0146 0.0262 46
ln(Income) −0:0017 0.0366 45
ln(Income)−1 0.0013 0.0633 44
Tax rate 0.00042 0.0848 46
Tax rate 0.0017 0.0958 45
Tax rate−1 -0.00097 0.1477 44
Audit rate x 1000 26.278 13.816 46
(Audit rate x 1000) -0.2099 4.7802 45
Note: The table reports means and standard deviations of variables used in the regressions reported in
Tables 3-5. et is the evasion rate on U.S. individual tax returns over the period 1947-1993, and et is its rst
dierence. \ln(Income)" is the log of U.S. personal income as reported in the national income and product
accounts; \ln(Income)" is its rst dierence, \ln(Income)" its second dierence, and \ln(Income)−1"
its lagged second dierence. \Tax rate" is the rst dierence of federal marginal income tax rates applying
to taxpayers with family incomes equal to the mean income of the top quintile of the U.S. income distribution;
\Tax rate" is its second dierence, and \Tax rate−1" its lagged second dierence. \Audit rate" is
the ratio of individual tax return audits to the number of individual tax returns led, and \Audit rate"
its rst dierence.
58APPENDIX TABLE B3
Means and Standard Deviations of Variables in Table 6
Variable Mean Std. Dev. No. Obs
lnet 0.0035 0.2122 45
(Potential liability), n =1 −0:0157 0.3211 45
(Potential liability), n =2 −0:0353 0.1990 44
(Potential liability), n =3 −0:0294 0.1790 43
(Potential liability), n =4 −0:0233 0.1778 42
(Potential liability), n =5 −0:0255 0.1718 41
Note: The table reports means and standard deviations of variables used in the regressions reported in
Table 6. lnet is the rst dierence of the log of the evasion rate on U.S. individual tax returns over the
period 1947-1993. \ Potential liability" is the rst dierence of the log of the (properly adjusted) sum of





First Differences of IRS-Imposed Penalties
and Unconstrained Lagged Evasion Rates.
Dependent Variable: ln(Γ t=Rt)
Constant −0:0058 −0:0051 −0:0113 −0:0152 −0:0178 −0:0182
(0.0299) (0.0247) (0.0223) (0.0191) (0.0177) (0.0177)
ln(Audit rate) 0.0113 0.0989 −0:0022 0.0297 −0:0117 −0:0303
(0.2482) (0.2063) (0.1878) (0.1610) (0.1496) (0.1515)
ln(et + et−1) 1.1783 0.8211 0.5882 0.4012 0.2991 0.3499
(0.0550) (0.0974) (0.1160) (0.1119) (0.1109) (0.1245)
ln(et−2) 0.3026 0.2837 0.2040 0.1513 0.1628
(0.0730) (0.0657) (0.0604) (0.0595) (0.0610)
ln(et−3) 0.2311 0.2426 0.2086 0.2185
(0.0757) (0.0649) (0.0614) (0.0625)






Adj. R2 .925 .949 .959 .970 .974 .974
D-W 1.737 1.764 1.889 2.079 1.797 1.811
Schwarz 7.789 13.750 16.656 21.346 23.155 21.829
N o . o b s . 3 83 83 83 83 83 8
60Note to Table B4: The table reports coecients from OLS regressions in which the dependent
variable is the rst dierence of the log of the ratio of penalties subsequent to audits (Γt)t ot a x
collections (Rt). The sample consists of annual observations for the United States between 1947-
1993. The data are constructed to treat calendar year evasion as contemporaneous with penalties
assessed two scal years later. The variable \ln(audit rate)" is the rst dierence of the log of the
ratio of individual tax return audits to the number of individual tax returns led. \ln(et+et−1)"











. \Schwarz" is the Schwarz statistic for lag length selection. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
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Note to Figure 1: The gure depicts the optimal current tax evasion rate as a function of
last period's tax evasion rate. The model for which the locus in Figure 1 is the solution has the
parameters: t(et)=0 :75e2
t,  =0 :25,  =0 :96, and g = r =0 :02.
62Figure 2






























Note to Figure 2: The probability of audit is assumed to be of the form t(et)=pe2
t. The gure
depicts the optimal current tax evasion rate as a function of last period's tax evasion rate for two
values of the parameter p. The solid line depicts optimal tax evasion rates for p =0 :75, the dotted
line to p =1 :0. The remaining parameters are  =0 :25,  =0 :96 and g = r =0 :02.
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Note to Figure 3: The gure depicts the optimal tax evasion rate in the years following an audit,
assuming no new audits take place. Thus the evasion rate converges to the conditional steady
state. The model used to simulate these responses has the parameters: t(et)=0 :75e2
t,  =0 :25,
 =0 :96, and g = r =0 :02.
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Note to Figure 4: The gure depicts the optimal current tax evasion rate over time. The taxpayer
is in the conditional steady state for the rst 10 periods but then encounters an unexpected one-
time 25% reduction in the tax rate. The model used to simulate this responses has the parameters:
t(et)=0 :75e2
t,  =0 :25,  =0 :96, and g = r =0 :02.
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Note to Figure 5: The gure depicts the optimal current tax evasion rate over time. The taxpayer
is in the conditional steady state for the rst 11 periods, but in period 12 encounters an unexpected,
and permanent, reduction in the degree of tax enforcement. The probability of audit is of the form
t(et)=pte2
t,i nw h i c hpt =1f o rt  11 and pt =0 :75 for t  12. The model used to simulate this
responses has the parameters:  =0 :25,  =0 :96, and g = r =0 :02.
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Note to Figure 6: The gure depicts aggregate tax evasion rates over time. During the rst
9 periods the cross-section of tax evasion is at the invariant distribution. In period 10 tax rates
rise unexpectedly and permanently by 33%. The model used to simulate these responses has the
parameters: t(et)=0 :75e2
t,  =0 :25,  =0 :96, and g = r =0 :02.
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Note to Figure 7: The gure depicts aggregate tax evasion rates over time. During the rst 9
periods the cross-section of tax evasion is at the invariant distribution. In period 10 tax enforcement
increases unexpectedly and permanently. The probability of audit is of the form t(et)=pte2
t,i n
which pt =0 :75 for t  9a n dpt =1f o rt  10. The model used to simulate these responses has
the parameters:  =0 :25,  =0 :96, and g = r =0 :02.
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